Incompetence or Deliberate Inaction? by R Renny
April 13 2014
Multi-Agency Report released
On April 10, 2014, the Inspectors General of the Intelligence Community, the CIA, the Department of Justice and Department of Homeland Security published an Unclassified Summary of a report on Information handling and sharing prior to the April 15, 2013 Boston Marathon Bombings.
As stated in the review, the objectives of this review were to determine:
• The extent of the information available to the U.S. government concerning the relevant individuals and events preceding the Boston Marathon bombings;
• Whether the sharing of this information was complete, accurate, and in compliance with U.S. counterterrorism and information sharing, policies, regulations, and U.S. laws; and
• Whether there are weaknesses in protocols and procedures that impact the ability to detect potential threats to national security.
The focus of the review was primarily on the FBI, the CIA, the DHS and the NCTC. There were four teams conducting the review (OIGs) – one for DoJ, one for CIA, one for DHS and one for the Intelligence Community (IC).
Although this report has been portrayed in the media as praising the relevant agencies for their excellent work and cooperation, and also blaming the Russians for all that went wrong (see the NY Times article), this review states already on page 3 that:
As stated in the review, the objectives of this review were to determine:
• The extent of the information available to the U.S. government concerning the relevant individuals and events preceding the Boston Marathon bombings;
• Whether the sharing of this information was complete, accurate, and in compliance with U.S. counterterrorism and information sharing, policies, regulations, and U.S. laws; and
• Whether there are weaknesses in protocols and procedures that impact the ability to detect potential threats to national security.
The focus of the review was primarily on the FBI, the CIA, the DHS and the NCTC. There were four teams conducting the review (OIGs) – one for DoJ, one for CIA, one for DHS and one for the Intelligence Community (IC).
Although this report has been portrayed in the media as praising the relevant agencies for their excellent work and cooperation, and also blaming the Russians for all that went wrong (see the NY Times article), this review states already on page 3 that:
“As described in more detail in the classified report, the DOJ OIG’s access to certain information was significantly delayed at the outset of the review by disagreements with FBI officials over whether certain requests fell outside the scope of the review or could cause harm to the criminal investigation. Only after many months of discussions were these issues resolved, and time that otherwise could have been devoted to completing this review was instead spent on resolving these matters"
In other words, the FBI has been stalling this review for ‘many months’. There goes your cooperation.
There are few redacted parts in this review, and they appear in the most critical parts of it in our opinion. The Inspectors General agree with us that these parts should be unredacted:
There are few redacted parts in this review, and they appear in the most critical parts of it in our opinion. The Inspectors General agree with us that these parts should be unredacted:
“We are requesting that the relevant entities reconsider those designations so that we can unredact those portions and make this information available to the public”
What does the review now tell us?
While we wait for them to do that, let’s have a look at what the review tells us now.
1) The CT Agent did not do anything right.
This is obviously not the conclusion of the review, but it is our conclusion after reading this review.
Although the review concludes that he applied the principle of the “least intrusive method” when investigating Tamerlan Tsarnaev, according to the AG guidelines, they seem to acknowledge that “the factual predication for a higher level of investigation was met”.
If we go back to the memorandum sent by the Russian FSB to the LEGAT office in Moscow, we find out that it alleged:
1) The CT Agent did not do anything right.
This is obviously not the conclusion of the review, but it is our conclusion after reading this review.
Although the review concludes that he applied the principle of the “least intrusive method” when investigating Tamerlan Tsarnaev, according to the AG guidelines, they seem to acknowledge that “the factual predication for a higher level of investigation was met”.
If we go back to the memorandum sent by the Russian FSB to the LEGAT office in Moscow, we find out that it alleged:
“that both (Tamerlan and Zubeidat) were adherents of radical Islam, and that Tamerlan Tsarnaev was preparing to travel to Russia to join unspecified “bandit underground groups” in Dagestan and Chechnya and had considered changing his last name to “Tsarni”
Now, what did the FBI CT agent do in response to this kind of information?
“The CT Agent conducted database searches, reviewed references to Tsarnaev and his family in closed FBI counterterrorism cases, performed “drive-bys” of Tsarnaev’s residence, made an on-site visit to his former college, and interviewed Tsarnaev and his parents. Based on information from database searches, the CT Agent determined that Tamerlan Tsarnaev’s last name was spelled “Tsarnaev,” and that his correct date of birth was October 21, 1986, information that differed from the lead memorandum from the FSB. During the assessment, the CT Agent asked a CBP officer on the Boston JTTF to create a (redacted) in TECS (the “JTTF TECS record”), which included the correct name and date of birth”
It is inconceivable that he didn’t find ANY ‘derogatory’ information by doing this. We all know that performing ‘drive-bys’ ALWAYS reveals if someone is an adherent of radical Islam or preparing to travel to Dagestan to join a terrorist group. We all know that visiting your former college that you left 3 years prior would ALWAYS reveal if you changed since then and now have radical views. And we all know that by talking to anyone who’s radical and their parents ALWAYS reveals their true nature and also future plans of any illegal activity.
Yes, that was sarcasm.
It is more revealing to learn exactly what the CT agent did not do.
- He did not contact local law enforcement (Cambridge) – although there was a prior arrest for assault from 2009.
- He did not visit the mosque that Tsarnaev attended – this could be seen as ‘profiling’ so we give him that, but as the ‘bulk’ of the information was regarding radical Islam, it would have been partially justified.
- He did not conduct interviews of Tamerlan’s wife (arguably the person that knew him best, other than his mother), former girlfriend (the one he was arrested for assaulting in 2009), or friends and associates (which would include a certain Brendan Mess at that time)
The CT agent explanation was that he “did not find sufficient derogatory information to justify taking these additional steps”.
Again, this is a total mystery considering what he did do.
Yes, that was sarcasm.
It is more revealing to learn exactly what the CT agent did not do.
- He did not contact local law enforcement (Cambridge) – although there was a prior arrest for assault from 2009.
- He did not visit the mosque that Tsarnaev attended – this could be seen as ‘profiling’ so we give him that, but as the ‘bulk’ of the information was regarding radical Islam, it would have been partially justified.
- He did not conduct interviews of Tamerlan’s wife (arguably the person that knew him best, other than his mother), former girlfriend (the one he was arrested for assaulting in 2009), or friends and associates (which would include a certain Brendan Mess at that time)
The CT agent explanation was that he “did not find sufficient derogatory information to justify taking these additional steps”.
Again, this is a total mystery considering what he did do.
They did nothing...
If we are to be serious, however, it is quite obvious why he did not find sufficient derogatory information – he did not really try.
Quite possibily there was no derogatory information to find: yet he made no attempt what so ever to confirm that, either way.
And he gives no areal explanation of his conduct. When asked why he did not ask the family and Tamerlan about plans to travel to Russia, his answer was “he did not know” (that portion is redacted).
Although this was the main concern of the Russians, he did not even bother to ask. It’s obviously possible they would have never told him even if it was planned, and it’s possible there was no such plan at the time – as both Anzor and Zubeidat were still living together with the kids in Cambridge. But the main reason why he was supposedly there was to find out about any radical views or plans to travel to Russia.
He never tried to do that.
One may only speculate what his motives were. Lack of time, lack of interest – it was a Russian problem in the end, right? - or deliberate inaction based on foreknowledge? Only he knows, but there are some signs to help us establish this.
Quite possibily there was no derogatory information to find: yet he made no attempt what so ever to confirm that, either way.
And he gives no areal explanation of his conduct. When asked why he did not ask the family and Tamerlan about plans to travel to Russia, his answer was “he did not know” (that portion is redacted).
Although this was the main concern of the Russians, he did not even bother to ask. It’s obviously possible they would have never told him even if it was planned, and it’s possible there was no such plan at the time – as both Anzor and Zubeidat were still living together with the kids in Cambridge. But the main reason why he was supposedly there was to find out about any radical views or plans to travel to Russia.
He never tried to do that.
One may only speculate what his motives were. Lack of time, lack of interest – it was a Russian problem in the end, right? - or deliberate inaction based on foreknowledge? Only he knows, but there are some signs to help us establish this.
What really happened?
The review states that there was a disagreement among the FBI officials about the significance of Tsarnaev’s travel to Russia. The CT agent is the only one who thinks it would have not been significant at all. In other words, after receiving a memo from Russia claiming that Tamerlan would travel to Dagestan, finding out that is what genuinely happened would not have been significant.
Think about it for a minute. Imagine you are an FBI agent and someone tells you “this guy will go to XY tomorrow and he will do this”. The next day the person does actually go to the specified place. Would you think it not significant? Or would your normal course of action be to let the LE in that area know about it?
The review concludes it was not possible to find out if the CT agent was informed by the CBP officer on the Boston JTTF about Tamerlan travelling to Russia. Neither of them was able to recall talking to each other or informing each other about it. However, the available information indicates, according to the review, that the CBP officer most likely did notify the CT agent about the impending travel.
Yet we know now, that even if he knew about it, he wouldn’t have done anything.
Think about it for a minute. Imagine you are an FBI agent and someone tells you “this guy will go to XY tomorrow and he will do this”. The next day the person does actually go to the specified place. Would you think it not significant? Or would your normal course of action be to let the LE in that area know about it?
The review concludes it was not possible to find out if the CT agent was informed by the CBP officer on the Boston JTTF about Tamerlan travelling to Russia. Neither of them was able to recall talking to each other or informing each other about it. However, the available information indicates, according to the review, that the CBP officer most likely did notify the CT agent about the impending travel.
Yet we know now, that even if he knew about it, he wouldn’t have done anything.
“When asked whether he would have considered taking further investigative steps had he learned of the travel at the time, the CT Agent said that he would not have done anything differently”
Unfortunately for the agent, his own supervisor disagrees with him. He states that:
“he would have expected the CT Agent to tell him in January 2012 about the TECS hit indicating that Tsarnaev was about to travel to Russia"
He adds that had he known about the travel, he probably would have reopened the assessment, interviewed Tsarnaev upon his departure from the United States, informed the LEGAT of the travel so that a determination could have been made about notifying the Russian government, and worked with the LEGAT to request information from the Russian government about "Tsarnaev’s activities in Russia”
Now, we have to consider that this is all said in retrospect and lot of officials will try to cover their actions or inactions by saying what would they have done differently, had they known what was going on. It’s completely possible that this same supervisor had known about Tamerlan’s travels and still didn’t do anything, because really what could have he done.
The problem occurs when the supervisor indicates that what he describes would have been the ‘normal course of action’. The CT Agent said he did not recall having a practice of notifying his supervisor of travel notifications in closed assessments. But the LEGAT office in Moscow begs to differ:
Now, we have to consider that this is all said in retrospect and lot of officials will try to cover their actions or inactions by saying what would they have done differently, had they known what was going on. It’s completely possible that this same supervisor had known about Tamerlan’s travels and still didn’t do anything, because really what could have he done.
The problem occurs when the supervisor indicates that what he describes would have been the ‘normal course of action’. The CT Agent said he did not recall having a practice of notifying his supervisor of travel notifications in closed assessments. But the LEGAT office in Moscow begs to differ:
“The LEGAT characterized the travel as “huge” and said that had this information been brought to his attention, he would have reported the information to CTD and the Boston Field Division for them to take any actions they deemed appropriate. He said that the “normal course of events” based on past cases would have been for the FBI to reopen the Guardian assessment and seek additional information from the FSB regarding Tsarnaev’s activities while in Russia”
Both the supervisor and the LEGAT in Moscow insist that the ‘normal course of events’ would have been to do something, although the assessment was closed.
The assessment was closed and there was nothing to see there. This fact is very important. From the moment the CT agent closed the assessment with the result of ‘no nexus to terrorism found’, he was using it as an argument for further inaction. No necessity to let anybody know Tamerlan was travelling – the assessment was closed. Later, in 2012, when Tamerlan applied for naturalization, both the FBI and DHS checked their databases – and again as the assessment was closed with the result of ‘no derogatory information found’ – that’s what their conclusion was. They even forgot about the assault arrest in 2009 – that’s how clean they wanted him to be:
The assessment was closed and there was nothing to see there. This fact is very important. From the moment the CT agent closed the assessment with the result of ‘no nexus to terrorism found’, he was using it as an argument for further inaction. No necessity to let anybody know Tamerlan was travelling – the assessment was closed. Later, in 2012, when Tamerlan applied for naturalization, both the FBI and DHS checked their databases – and again as the assessment was closed with the result of ‘no derogatory information found’ – that’s what their conclusion was. They even forgot about the assault arrest in 2009 – that’s how clean they wanted him to be:
“In late November 2012, in response to a USCIS information request, the FBI conducted a database search and drafted a memorandum stating that there was no derogatory information about Tsarnaev. On December 3, 2012, the FBI returned additional information results showing Tsarnaev’s arrest for assault and battery of his former girlfriend in July 2009”
The conclusion is that Tamerlan’s file was crystal clear, not because there really was nothing going on in his life – but because the FBI did all they could to keep it that way. The reluctance of the FBI CT agent to act and do anything to really investigate Tsarnaev is not due to his lack of interest in Russian affairs or inability to see the consequences of his inaction. It seems that he knew very well what he was doing. He did not notify the LEGAT office in Moscow of Tamerlan’s travels not because he thought it was not significant, but because he didn’t want them to know. He knew that the ‘normal course of events’ would have been to reopen the assessment. He wanted to prevent that from happening at all costs.
Memory loss, sticky notes, and a smoking gun
It is difficult to prove what the CT agent did or didn’t know, due to the fact that all the communication on the JTTF seems to have been orally or on ‘sticky notes’. As CT agent ‘cannot recall’ almost anything he’d done, and there’s no record of his communications with the CBP officer, he can always deny knowledge of just about anything.
This is the ‘smoking gun’ of this report. Not surprisingly it is completely redacted. It is on page 18, under the paragraph that is introduced by this:
- January 2011 communications
This is the ‘smoking gun’ of this report. Not surprisingly it is completely redacted. It is on page 18, under the paragraph that is introduced by this:
“The OIG teams examined information that existed prior to the bombings but was not obtained or first accessed and reviewed until after the bombings”
It was originally inadvertently leaked by the NY Times and noticed by many, most notably Russ Baker at WhoWhatWhy, that there was some investigation into Tamerlan’s activities already in January 2011 – that is two months prior to the alert from Russia.
The NY Times article states:
The NY Times article states:
“In January 2011, two counterterrorism agents from the bureau’s Boston field office interviewed Tamerlan and family members, a senior law enforcement official said on Saturday”
The NY Times never ‘corrected the mistake’ and now this official report acknowledges that there was something going on in January 2011. As it is redacted, we cannot be sure what exactly did they know, but there was some communication(s).
As I pointed out in my previous articles, the FBI director himself acknowledged that Tamerlan was on the radar of the FBI on two separate occasions prior to the Russian alert, not as a suspect but one or two people away.
The report states that the former girlfriend provided information regarding the changes in Tamerlan’s behaviour and appearance between 2006 and 2009, “including his growing interest in videos about Islam.” It concludes that even if they had interviewed her back in 2011, there was no way of knowing what she would have said at the time. This is interesting in retrospect as it confirms the claims of uncle Ruslan who said he fell out with the Tsarnaevs sometime in 2009 and never spoke with them since. If both the uncle and the girlfriend claim that Tamerlan acted ‘radical’ in 2009, how is it possible that the CT agent in 2011 could not see any of that?
Oh, right, we know how – he didn’t look.
Another smoking gun, and another redacted portion of the report. The visible text says that the NSA provided some information on request from the IC OIG.
As I pointed out in my previous articles, the FBI director himself acknowledged that Tamerlan was on the radar of the FBI on two separate occasions prior to the Russian alert, not as a suspect but one or two people away.
- Tamerlan’s ‘radicalization’
The report states that the former girlfriend provided information regarding the changes in Tamerlan’s behaviour and appearance between 2006 and 2009, “including his growing interest in videos about Islam.” It concludes that even if they had interviewed her back in 2011, there was no way of knowing what she would have said at the time. This is interesting in retrospect as it confirms the claims of uncle Ruslan who said he fell out with the Tsarnaevs sometime in 2009 and never spoke with them since. If both the uncle and the girlfriend claim that Tamerlan acted ‘radical’ in 2009, how is it possible that the CT agent in 2011 could not see any of that?
Oh, right, we know how – he didn’t look.
- NSA information from 2012
Another smoking gun, and another redacted portion of the report. The visible text says that the NSA provided some information on request from the IC OIG.
“Included in this production was information from 2012 (redacted)… The information concerned (redacted)… This information was not accessed and reviewed until after the bombings. (redacted)”
We don’t know what this information was concerning but we know it was there. The prosecution has denied to the defence there was any ‘surveillance’ on Tsarnaev at any time prior to the bombings. Here, we have a concrete piece of evidence saying they’re not telling us the truth.
Incompetence or Deliberate Inaction?
In conclusion, this report does not place the blame on the Russian ‘refusal to share information’ as the NY Times would want you to believe. This report proves that:
- the FBI had some knowledge of Tamerlan Tsarnaev even prior to the Russian alert
- the FBI CT agent did not attempt to respond to the Russian alert in any sensible manner which led to further inaction whenever Tamerlan’s name appeared on the radar again
- whatever was going on in Tamerlan’s life after 2009, everybody (including the Russian FSB who were thousands of miles away) was able to see the change in his behaviour and appearance, except the FBI CT agent
- the NSA was collecting some kind of information on Tamerlan in 2012.
Put simply, it looks like the public have been lied to - yet again.
Related posts:
Tamerlan's passport and the terror watchlist issue
Connections: Welcome to Spooksville
NIP: Officer Sean Gannon: More evidence that the FBI knew the identities of the suspected marathon bombers prior to April 19th?
Connections: Welcome to Spooksville
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________________________________________________
We actively encourage comments, discussion and debate on this site! Please remember to keep it relevant and be respectful at all times.